Rajapaksa manifesto

Infrastructure seems to be his strong suit

The Rajapaksa manifesto is development driven --- development is in fact, Rajapaksa’s strong point in his campaign for a second term.
Mahinda Rajapaksa believes, not without compelling reasons, that he is perhaps the only leader who built infrastructure, the catalyst of economic growth. He may be correct.
Though most of projects initiated by his administration are yet to be completed, any fair assessment of his four-year tenure could not discount that Rajapaksa genuinely made an attempt to build hitherto neglected roads, fly-overs, ports and airports. That is where he differs from the rest of the post colonial political leaders, whose main claim for power -- other than dynastic politics -- is doling out the government revenue in name of subsidies. Not that Rajapaksa is a totally different kettle of fish as far as the political species in parliament is concerned, but, at least when it comes to economy, he differs.
The focal point of his 103 page election manifesto released last week was economic growth driven by active government participation in infrastructure development. That is the Chinese model of economic growth and has been proved to be resilient against a world-wide economic slump. He promises to double the per capita income in four years --- per capita income increased from 1000 US$ to 2000 US$ during his first tenure as the president, to maintain an 8 per cent growth rate and to transform Sri Lanka into an aviation, naval, financial and knowledge hub of Asia. That is not wishful thinking alone. That post independent political leaders failed in delivering economic prosperity is not a reason to disparage Rajapaksa’s pledge. There are others who pledged and delivered.
Lee Kuan Yew taking over the office in Singapore pledged to make Singapore a Sri Lanka perhaps out of nostalgia in his school days in Bonavista, Galle. Later, while successive Sri Lankan leaders faltered, he turned that once malaria infested British colonial port into a global financial and maritime hub.

First term

Rajapaksa’s score sheet in his first term of office has a strong bias for infrastructure development. During the last four years, over 2200km of national highways were broadened, equivalent to the scale of road development in the previous two decades. Work commenced at a new international port, an international airport, plus several other local ports and airports; new power plants were commissioned and construction of many other projects commenced.
His critics argue that these projects were planned by his predecessors, notably the Kumaratunga Administration. That, in fact, juxtaposes Rajapaksa’s resolve against his predecessor’s indecisiveness that dropped planned projects at the first sign of protests. The problem of infrastructure development in this country was not in their planning, but their implementation. The coal power plant now being built in Norachcholai was first mooted by the Ranasinghe Premadasa Administration. The Upper Kotmale Hydro Power Plant was left in limbo by both Kumaratunga administration and the Wickremesinghe administration. Colombo-Matara expressway was running behind schedule because successive governments were dilly-dallying with the project over the takeover of land. Same it is with many other projects, which finally took off under the Rajapaksa regime behind schedule. Industrialization and its offshoot, modernization do not necessarily turn out to be a pleasant exercise to some people in a world where there are so many interest groups. That’s where the resolve of the political leadership matters. That perhaps explains why the economic take off the Tiger economies in South East Asia and East Asia is largely attributed to the pro-growth authoritarian rulers in the region --- increasing economic prosperity in those countries later unleashed forces of modernization, which have now gradually opened up the political space, ensuring greater civil and political liberties.
Rajapaksa is not a clone of Park Chung-hee, South Korean dictator who oversaw Korea’s economic miracle. Rajapaksa is backed up by political legitimacy, reinforced by the recent election victories of his party. Popular support is an asset, but sometimes it could also be a liability. Rajapaksa’s predecessors caved in before the protests against manifold development projects by interest parties, in order not to unsettle their electorates. But that was at the cost of country’s development. Some others cut corners from the capital budget to dole out subsidies. These past misadventures explain why Sri Lanka is a basket case as far as infrastructure is concerned.

Information Technology

Equally interesting is Rajapaksa’s fascination with Information Technology. He had pledged to increase IT literacy to 75 per cent from current 20 per cent and build IT faculties in every university, initiate a scholarship program for IT education, promote Business Process Outsourcing and send a homemade satellite to space.
There was another leader whose fascination with IT, even at the infancy of information revolution was behind his country’s transformation as a technological powerhouse in South East Asia: Mahathir Mohamad who built Putrajaya to suit his vision for future Malaysia. If Rajapaksa is given a chance to realize his vision, one could perhaps bet Sri Lanka would at least be better off with better infrastructure.
But, just as his manifesto scored on his strong points, it had failed to address his problematic areas. That is a huge lacuna in his manifesto. There is a strong public perception of corruption and nepotism associated with his regime. Denial would not help. He has to face it and tackle the problem. But, his manifesto is devoid of any reference to strengthening the Bribery Commission or any other realistic alternative to tackle corruption and nepotism.
There are serious concerns about growing absolutism of his regime and politicization of state apparatus. Such concerns have received scant attention in the Rajapaksa manifesto. There is hardly any mention about the 17 amendment. There is a vague reference to the devolution of powers. There are several other pledges to change the electoral system to a first past the post system and to curb powers of the executive presidency. The problem, however, is that they are old wine in new bottles. Same pledges have been given in the past. The psychology of the Rajapaksa Administration is one of the concentrations of power, not the separation of powers. In the final analysis, Rajapaksa’s political legacy is one of ambiguity. His supporters see him as a saviour who won the war and would win the economic war also. His opponents loathe him for his growing absolutism. Both are not without compelling reasons to do so.

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fonseka manifesto

Fonseka’s ‘believable’ changes ...

Fonseka scores where Rajapaksa failed: restoring democracy - That may be a broad generalization of Fonseka’s attributes vis a vis Rajapaksa, but at least that is how Fonseka’s camp presents his manifesto.
His critics argue that it could be an unlikely task for the former army chief, subsequently promoted to chief of defence staff, whose ruthless efficiency in war led to the decimation of the Tamil Tigers.
But, the Fonseka camp says the former army chief means business. He pledges to reactivate the 17th amendment and to re-establish the constituent council, the first thing after his possible election to the highest office in the country.
He promises to present a cabinet paper within the first month of his election to abolish the executive presidency. He pledges to dissolve the parliament, set up a care-taker government, and to present urgent cabinet papers to abolish the executive presidency and the press council bill, as well as to pass a freedom of information act. These are focal points as far as liberal democracy is concerned, but that successive political leaders reneged on these promises is a cause for a great deal of public apathy to such an undertaking. The prospect of political leaders willfully reining in their powers is totally alien to the Sri Lankan political culture. The only recent example, the 17th amendment was passed by the Kumaratunga administration as a precondition set by the JVP for a probationary government in order to prevent an imminent collapse of her regime. If elected, Gen Fonseka would be immune from sudden fallout. This leaves Sri Lankans to relay on his altruism to mandate the proposed changes in the system. However, needless to say those changes are mandatory for Sri Lanka to avert the erosion of democracy.

White van culture

Fonseka pledges an end to the “white van culture” and extra-judicial killings and promises a Sri Lanka without IDPs. He strikes at the Achilles’ heal of the Rajapaksa Administration, promising to tackle corruption, to set up powerful agency to combat corruption and to enact legislation in line with the UN Convention Against Corruption. His manifesto draws from a study by Professor A.D.V.S Indraratne, President of the Sri Lanka Economic Association who states that corruption cost 9 per cent of GDP in 2006. Based on the projected GDP figures of 2009, the estimated loss would amount 350 billion -- 400 billion rupees, which is 15 times of country’s education budget. These figures also speak about corruption which is endemic at all layers of public life. They are also a pointer to the failure in the current bribery commission which has made a reputation for catching the small fish, leaving the big fish.
Fonseka’s two main pledges - combat corruption and restore democracy --- are indeed pivotal points. But, he leaves another key point untouched, which would be a disappointment to Tamils.
There is hardly any mention about his vision for the devolution of powers. He provides a broad generalization: Sri Lanka with a strong Sri Lankan identity based on its ethnic and cultural diversity. How he achieves that, while leaving root causes which led to a separatist insurgency unaddressed is left to our imagination. His camp argues that the constitution making would be the prerogative of the parliament and that any tampering with this process by the president would be counter productive. While this claim sounds plausible, provided it is made in good faith, the differences within the Fonseka’s coalition over the devolution of powers are a public secret. Therefore, if Fonseka has a chance, there is no guarantee that his current allies would fight open battles with each other over the nature of the devolution of powers. It can safely be assumed that at one point in the future, Fonseka would be compelled to cast off the JVP, the ultra nationalist party if he is to mediate to secure any meaningful solution to the ethnic question.

Gift vouchers

Set aside these focal points, the rest of the Fonseka manifesto is a Christmas gift voucher. He promises to increase the public servants salary by 10,000 rupees, minimum Samurdhi subsidy to 500 rupees and the minimum wage of the estate workers to 500 rupees. He promises to slash the taxes levied on essential goods and LG gas and provide monthly training allowance of 2000 rupees to youth and another 3000 rupees to unemployed graduates. True that the public struggling to make days ends meet find such pledges are conciliatory. But, the economic impact of their implementation would not always be salubrious to the overall economy. Fonseka’s manifesto is too vague on his vision for education, health and infrastructure development. Sketchy details on those issues are attributed to the fact that Fonseka runs to abolish the executive presidency, thereby to transfer powers to parliament. If that is the case, the buck would be passed to the main constituent party of Fonseka’s camp, UNP, which is however known for its frugality. Fonseka and Rajapaksa represent two opposite schools of thought. Fonseka’s manifesto draws heavily from liberal democratic traditions while Rajapaksa focuses more on the economic growth, which however leaves some key concerns of good governance and democracy untouched.