Maybe Digamadulla can be left to the SLMC, maybe Trincomalee and Batticaloa are opportunities...

The General must stand and fight

I do not have the right to tell General Fonseka what to do since as a Leftist I do not subscribe to his political perspectives and therefore will not belong to his political party if he forms one. I am however interested in an anti-fascist alliance with him. Secondly, nobody has a right to tell another person what risks to life and limb he should expose himself and his family to; that is a personal decision. Furthermore, given the vicious nature of the regime, I believe Fonseka when he says that his life is under threat and declares that he may be arrested on trumped up charges. Stories of ridiculous coups and assassination plots are being manufactured under our very eyes. I oppose this as strongly as I will oppose any actual attempt to remove President Rajapaksa from office by unlawful means. I am surprised the Administration does not see that its game is so crude that the public, including UPFA people I have talked to, just scoff. Maybe that’s just the point! Now they are so conceited, they don’t care two bits what anybody else, the public, or the whole world, thinks!
Having made this rather lengthy and apologetic introduction let me get to the political substance of this article, which is that if General Fonseka decides to dig in and fight against the post-election acceleration to dictatorship, then he can make an important contribution. As the candidate who garnered 4.2 million votes, if the government arrests him for blatantly political motives it will be throwing itself into the bramble bush, and for the same reason if Fonseka agrees to play a leading role in an anti-fascist mobilisation he can enthuse a considerable section of his voters. I say this knowing that in a formal counting these voters are UNP, SLMC, TNA and JVP followers, but in a critical confrontation the leading opposition figurehead becomes the focal point of enthusiasm.

Holding the alliance together

The first step is to consolidate the alliance that came together to form the Joint Opposition, plus others like the TNA who extended support for regime change. The anti-government Left parties must also join. There are two hurdles to clear in holding the alliance together; first how the different parties are going to fight the next general election and the second the insidious problem of those who may cut backdoor deals with the Rajapaksas. The second problem is actually the easier one to sort out; or rather, it is self-sorting. If somebody wants to opt-out in exchange for thirty pieces of silver or the promise of cabinet filth, well show him the door - what else?
The more difficult problem is negotiating the next general elections under a list based proportional representation system. The problem is the UNP-JVP conundrum; the SLMC-TNA relationship is much easier to sort out and to do so in a politically principled way. Let me deal with the easy one first. The SLMC and TNA have used the Fonseka weapon to prove that they are going to make a clean sweep of the Eastern and Northern Provinces. At a fundamental level there is programmatic commonality between these two parties as minority representatives with a common interest in pluralist power sharing and regional or sub-regional autonomy. With this commonality of interests surely they can work out a shared programmatic stance and a division of districts. Maybe Digamadulla can be left to the SLMC, maybe Trincomalee and Batticaloa are opportunities for a shared list, maybe SLMC names can be included on a TNA dominated Vanni list - remember Muslim Mannar. Of course I am not so silly as to be prescriptive, just throwing out food for thought; hard work needs to be done.
I find it difficult to see the UNP and JVP putting forward a single slate in any district. They will each need some distinctive policy and programme inputs that will be anathema to the other. And they hate each others guts because of 1989-91. As a compromise, the JVP could agree to refrain from contesting in districts where they have little support, and in those districts where both contest it can be agreed that they will target the UPFA and not each other. Limiting contest in the proportional representation system is not as easy as in the constituency based system, but with good planning, organisation and understanding a workable arrangement to inflict maximum damage on the UPFA is feasible. Mangala is astute but now bruised, but his machinations can still be useful.
General Fonseka must throw his weight into the fray and there are moves to accommodate him in a leadership role. It will be best if the leadership of the UNP and the Joint Opposition are split. The UNP and JVP must refrain from contesting in SLMC-TNA areas of strength except where they can split the UPFA vote. The indispensable guiding strategy and priority are transparently clear; to pull down the UPFA to the largest extent possible.

The Anti-Fascist long haul

The general election is only a distraction that will last till April; the real concern is fighting the trend to dictatorship in the long haul, the next two or three years - after that the regime will be buckling at its knees. Strictly speaking there is no likelihood of fascism in its classic Italian and German pre-war form in today’s Lanka, but Anti-Dictatorial is such an ungainly name that I had to opt for Anti-Fascist. Nomenclature aside, the urgent need is for the full opposition to stand firm against the repression that this regime has embarked on. Furthermore, it must not retreat on the concessions it offered to the Tamils in the presidential campaign while the Rajapaksa bandwagon was rousing Sinhala racism during the final weeks. The need is for a genuine Left-Right-Minority united front which will have the courage to explain patiently to the Sinhala people, over the next three to six years, that there is no way forward without an open settlement between the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim peoples in respect of their long term relationship.
Already the dogs have been set at General Fonseka’s throat, a pro-JVP newspaper has been sealed,but subsequently restarted after a court order, a JVP local government council chairman removed, another journalist has disappeared and no prizes for guessing who is behind it. These are Gestapo tactics and the worst is still to come. The worst of the Gestapo stuff will be held back till after elections, then the real music will start. An Anti-Fascist Front or Anti Repression Council with Left-Right-Minority participation is an absolute necessity. The mobilisation to expose the canard against Fonseka and the repression of a JVP newspaper is a good start. A repeat performance of electoral violence in the North is a challenge to prepare for. If Fonseka is willing to stand and fight he can contribute immeasurably. He sure has a lot to learn; how to think political strategy and how to walk the talk like a mature politician. He also has to stand firm on the forward steps he has taken on the national question. It is a learning curve, but he is climbing.

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